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Abstract 
The  impact  of  instrument  choice  on  
investment  in abatement  technologies: a case 
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Biomass for electricity 
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Tim Laing and Michael Grubb  
 
There has been a wide discussion on the different properties between 
carbon taxes, cap-and-trade schemes and hybrid instruments such as 
cap-and-trade schemes with price floors and ceilings. There has been 
less discussion on the incentives to investment that each of these 
instruments may provide. We build a three-period model to investigate 
the incentives offered to a large firm with diversified abatement options 
from such instruments when facing a choice between investing in low-
carbon technologies with potential learning benefits. We parameterise 
our model for a system similar to the EUETS and for two sample 
technologies, biomass for electricity and coal with carbon capture and 
storage. For both technologies we find that cap-and-trade schemes 
generate greater mean returns to such an investment than taxes, but 
with a wider distribution. We find that introducing price floors increase 
such mean returns while reducing the distribution, while ceilings further 
reduce the distribution, but also the mean and thus the overall incentives 
they offer will depend on the risk preference of the firm and scale of 
investment in relation to overall compliance costs.    
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The impact  of  instrument  choice  on  investment 
 in new abatement  technologies: a case study of 
tax versus trade incentives for CCS and Biomass 
for electricity 
 
Tim Laing12 
Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge  
Michael Grubb1  
Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The greenhouse gases reductions that will be necessary to limit the damages 
from climate change are likely to require widespread innovation in, and 
deployment of, new technologies. This will require both large additional 
investments, and also a shift from investment in carbon polluting technologies. 
Placing a price on carbon emissions, either through a tax or through cap-and-
trade schemes helps to incentivise such technologies. This is especially crucial 
for both end-of-the-pipe technologies such as Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
(CCS) for which the only motivation to implement is to reduce carbon emissions 
– and also technologies such as biomass for power which have potentially wider 
benefits (such as energy security), but for which carbon policies can provide 
significant incentives nonetheless. Providing clear and sufficient incentives for 
both types of technologies is one of the multiple aims of carbon mitigation 
policies.  
 
The levels of investment that instruments to address carbon abatement drive 
may be crucial in meeting the long-term challenge of mitigation. CCS is predicted 
to play a major role in both the electricity and industrial sector in the decades to 
come (for example see Anandarajah et al 2009), yet so far there has been limited 
private sector investment. Biomass energy utilisation is a technology that is 
attractive for its carbon neutrality and can potentially meet a wide variety of 
energy needs including electricity supply. Doubts remain over the stability of 
supply chains, and development in this area from learning-by-doing is crucial for 
a wider deployment of the technology.   
 
                                                 
1 Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge,  
2 Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, 
Cambridge CB3 9DD tjl40@cam.ac.uk 
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The returns that an investment in such technologies may yield to investors 
depend on the exact nature of the carbon policy implemented by governments. 
Our work compares the differing firm-level returns to investment that these 
different instruments yield.   
 
Under certainty and complete information, there is equivalence between 
taxation and quantity controls for controlling pollution. For many situations 
including climate change, however, there is neither certainty nor complete 
information. Uncertainties persist over both the costs of controlling emissions 
and the damages emanating from these emissions, as well as the associated 
nature of, and the response to, future policies; and all of these compounds the 
asymmetric information that exists between firms and regulators. An example of 
the range of uncertainty over damages or the social cost of carbon can be seen in 
Figure 1. Estimates for 2050, even for this specific model vary by a factor of more 
than twenty. 
 
The uncertainties can be grouped into two basic areas. The first concerns the 
likely ‘cost of carbon’ that firms will face. Uncertainties over the impact of 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions on the climate compound with geographical 
and economic factors to create large uncertainties over the level of damages, 
resulting from a certain level of GHG emissions. In addition there is major policy 
uncertainty over both the choice and level of instruments put in place to address 
carbon abatement their economic implications. It is through this channel of 
policy that such uncertainties manifest themselves to firms. 
 
The second area of uncertainty relates to that arising around possible mitigation 
technologies. Uncertainty and asymmetric information exists over many facets of 
such technologies. As many of the technologies that are likely to be required are 
new and relatively sparsely deployed there are large uncertainties over the pace 
and scale of feasible deployment of these technologies, along with wide ranges of 
estimates over both capital and operating costs. These uncertainties are likely to 
be larger for regulators than for firms due to asymmetric information between 
the parties. 
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Figure 1: Social cost of carbon over time, Hope and Newberry (2008) 
    
Our aim is to investigate the impact that the choice of instruments has on firm-
level incentives to invest in a new technology in a world with uncertainties such 
as those described above. It is well established that carbon pricing can play a key 
role in creating incentives (see for example Stern 2006, and earlier work by 
Pigou 1920 and Coase 1960). However there is a long standing debate about the 
relative merits of doing so through a direct tax, or through a system that caps 
quantities and establishes a market in emission allowances (cap-and-trade).   
 
The debate has been reflected in policy development. In 1990 the US established 
a cap-and-trade scheme for regulating SO2 emissions, and during the subsequent 
decade the EU attempted to introduce a carbon tax for regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions. The EU's carbon tax eventually failed after widespread opposition 
from industry and several member states (Anderson et al 1996, Bergesen et al 
1994) and around 2000 EU efforts switched to considering a cap-and-trade 
scheme for carbon dioxide, which came into force in 2005. However, volatility in 
the price (coupled with surplus allocations) - and opposition in the US to plans 
for a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade scheme there - have renewed some political 
debate about the choice. The experience points to potential political economy 
advantages to a cap-and-trade approach, but this paper focuses upon economic 
incentives. 
 
We build on existing strands of work that model the choice between taxes and 
quantity constraints when viewed from a societal perspective and work that 
compares the impact that the choice of instruments has on investment incentives 
in a world without uncertainty.  
 
We build a simple, stylised, multi-period model to examine the returns that a 
firm can obtain from investing in a new abatement technology. We explore its 
behaviour and implications using parameters for two technologies, Biomass for 
electricity and CCS, and for a trading system similar to the EU’s Emission Trading 
Scheme (EUETS) to gain greater insights relevant to the climate change problem. 
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Our model generates distributions of the returns over and above investment for 
both technologies against a reference investment. We obtain distributions for 
taxes (under different methods of formation), cap-and-trade schemes and cap-
and-trade schemes with price floors and ceilings. We find that the distribution of 
returns vary between these instruments, with cap-and-trade schemes generating 
greater mean returns than taxes in two out of three cases, but with a much wider 
distribution of returns. The introduction of floors can increase average returns 
and reduce the distribution, while ceilings further reduce the distribution but at 
the cost of average returns. 
 
Our work adds to the literature in a number of areas, by adding uncertainty into 
the discussion of investment incentives from different instruments for pollution, 
by focusing previous work comparing instruments under uncertainty on the 
incentives they offer to firms, by extending work into a multi-period world with a 
programme of investment and by applying such work to potentially important 
technologies. 
 
In Section 2 we discuss some of the existing literature in this area. Section 3 
outlines the theoretical model that we construct. In Section 4 we describe the 
data we use for calibration of the model. Section 5 outlines our results from the 
calibrated model. We discuss implications for policy in Section 6 and conclude in 
Section 7. 
 
 2. Literature 
 
Investment under uncertainty has been studied extensively in the literature 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Cabelero 1991). Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008) applied 
this literature to climate change by analysing how the level of socially optimal 
R&D investment changes with the risk profile of the R&D program and 
uncertainty about climate damages. They examine two types of technical change, 
differentiated by their effect on the abatement cost function: one which they 
term ‘alternative R&D’, which shifts the abatement cost function down by a fixed 
percentage; and the second which they term ‘conventional technology’, which 
reduces the emissions-output ratio and reduces everywhere (weakly) the cost of 
abatement, whilst leaving the full cost of abatement unchanged. The latter of 
these changes has the affect of reducing the marginal cost in some areas of the 
curve, whilst increasing it at higher levels of abatement, implying a pivot of the 
affine marginal abatement curve. In the first case of technical change they find 
that optimal investment is higher in risky R&D than in non-risky, while in the 
latter the level of investment in R&D depends more on the level of damages from 
climate change than the risk profile of the R&D. 
 
A number of authors have undertaken work which rank different policies such as 
taxes, auctioned and free permits and performance standards for pollution 
abatement according to the firm level incentives to undertake investment in 
abatement technologies that they yield (Milliman and Price 1986, Jung, Krutilla 
and Boyd 1996, Montero 2000, Requate and Unold 2001). This group of work 
yields different rankings of instruments depending on assumptions over the type 
of firm or industry undertaking investment, the stage in the innovation process 
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and the market structure of output and permit markets. One common feature 
among this literature is the absence of uncertainty in its analysis. 
 
This omission of uncertainty is a major limiting factor in applying the literature’s 
conclusions to problems such as climate change. A second strand of literature 
has compared the properties of instruments such as taxes and quantity 
constraints, both traded and non-traded in the presence of uncertainty. This 
literature uses both analytical and parameterised models that examine the 
differing properties of instruments for pollution control from a broader 
perspective, focusing on overall societal benefits rather than firm-level 
incentives to investment.   
 
Weitzman (1974) investigated the choice between taxes and quantities in the 
presence of uncertainty and found that the comparative advantage of prices over 
quantities depends on the relative slopes of the marginal cost and benefit curves.   
 
Weitzman’s work is not climate-specific, although it has been used to reach 
conclusions regarding the issue. The social cost of carbon, (the marginal benefit 
of abatement), can be assumed to have a smaller slope (at least in terms of near-
time abatement) than marginal abatement costs, assuming climate change to be 
a fundamentally stock problem. Damages are linked to aggregate GHG 
concentrations, thus one tonne of GHG emitted has similar costs as any other, 
implying a relatively flat social cost of carbon curve. Abatement costs, on the 
other hand, rise sharply as abatement increases, as there are a number of 
relatively cheap mitigation opportunities available (energy efficiency for 
example), but once these opportunities have been utilised costs rise sharply. As 
argued by several subsequent authors Weitzman’s analysis, would, from this 
perspective, favour the use of carbon taxes over quantity constraints. Figure 2a 
shows an example of the Weitzman analysis where both the abatement costs and 
the social costs are subject to a certain degree of uncertainty. In the diagram 
taxes and quantity constraints are determined as per the expected levels of 
marginal abatement costs (MACE) and social costs of carbon (with taxes at TE, 
and quantity constraints at QE). If however marginal abatement costs are actually 
higher than expected (MACReal, where QReal represents the efficient level of 
abatement in such a case), the efficiency loss from taxes is far smaller than that 
from permit schemes, thus favouring the use of taxes.   
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Figure 2a: Stylised representation of the instrument choice problem) stylised (Source: Dietz 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Representation of the climate problem reflecting further details 
 
In reality the climate problem is more complex than the stylised representation 
in Figure 2a. Figure 2b illustrates a more accurate portrayal of the climate 
problem. The scale of uncertainty over damages is vast, even larger than that 
portrayed here and certainly greater than that surrounding marginal abatement 
costs.  Marginal abatement costs curves are also highly convex, thus their slope 
depends on the scale of abatement being considered. The ‘stock’ nature of 
climate change, along with issues of inertia, and long-term investments that are a 
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large part of the energy system, means that the problem must be seen in a 
dynamic context; such features, along with the impact of innovation can both 
shift and change the slope of the marginal abatement curve. Taking into account 
these elements means that the issue of the optimal choice of instrument is still 
unresolved.      
 
Post-Weitzman there has been a number of papers extending his work in some of 
these highlighted areas and extending his analysis to the climate problem. 
Stavins (1996) extended the work by examining the case when cost and benefit 
uncertainties are correlated and found that positive correlations tend to favour 
quantity instruments while negative correlations favour price instruments. For 
plausible values of parameters they find that quantity instruments may be 
favoured over price instruments.   
 
Hoel and Karp (2001) compare taxes and quotas when regulators have 
asymmetric info about the slope of firms' abatement costs with damages arising 
from a stock pollutant. Using an integrated climate-economy model without 
endogenous technology change Pizer (2002) found that taxes are more efficient 
than permits by a factor of five to one, though a hybrid policy allows the same 
efficiency while maintaining the flexibility to distribute the rents. Newell and 
Pizer (2003) extend Weitzman’s analysis to stock externalities. As in Weitzman 
they find that relative slopes are the key determinants of the efficiency of the 
instruments, however they find that further elements are also important 
including correlation of cost shocks over time, discounting, stock decay and the 
rate of benefits growth. 
 
Phillibert (2008) uses an Abatement Costs Temperature Changes (ACTC) model 
to conduct a quantitative assessment of price caps and floors, concluding that 
hybrid instruments may be better than any single instrument. They calibrate the 
model using estimates for greenhouse gases and find that taxes produce greater 
overall returns than quotas when there is multiplicative uncertainty.    
 
Weber and Neuhoff (2008) examine the effects of firm-level innovation in 
carbon-abatement technologies on optimal cap-and-trade schemes with and 
without price controls through an analytical model. They find that an increase in 
innovation effectiveness lowers optimal emissions caps and relaxes price 
controls. Innovation makes the optimal instrument more similar to a cap; it 
widens the spread of the optimal floor and ceiling. 
 
Although the area of suitable instrument choice for mitigation of GHG emissions 
has been widely studied, there is little work in the specific area of the firm-level 
investment incentives in a world with uncertainty. Our work sits between the 
strand of literature that focuses on investment incentives to firms of pollution 
abatement instruments, and the strand focusing on the overall choice of 
instruments for climate change. We build on the literature examining incentives 
by offering an alternative modelling of the impact of a new technology on the 
abatement curve, building in uncertainties and parameterising for relevant 
technologies. We draw lessons from the literature examining the overall 
efficiency of cap-and-trade schemes versus tax regimes under uncertainty, 
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parameterised for climate change and apply them to a focused analysis on the 
investment-incentives offered to a firm. 
 
 3. Model 
 
We construct a three-period model to examine the effects of a taxation regime 
and a cap-and-trade scheme on the incentives to invest in a new carbon-abating 
technology in the presence of uncertainties. We construct a theoretical 
framework and parameterise the model to two example technologies, biomass 
for electricity and CCS, running the model under Monte-Carlo simulations. Our 
model generates returns to an investment in the technology over a three period 
time-frame (we use t to represent time period, }3,2,1{∈t ) in comparison to a 
reference investment. We compare the distributions of these returns under the 
different instruments.       
 
Our focus is on how the policy environment affects the incentives for any 
individual firm to invest in a risky low carbon technology. We allow for the 
possibility that the firm and the technology may be non-marginal to the system, 
i.e. that the firms choice may have non-negligible implications for the overall 
system’s emissions and thus implications for carbon prices. 
 
Specifically we analyse the incentives on a specific energy supplying firm, F, who 
can undertake an investment in a new technology, NT. The firm operates under a 
climate policy, either a tax or a cap and trade scheme. The remainder of firms 
operating under the climate policy are represented as a single system, S, and are 
assumed to not invest in the new technology.    
 
We make a number of assumptions regarding the technology, the market 
characteristics and the abatement options open to the firm.   
 
Technologies involved in abating emissions have very different properties. These 
properties affect how the introduction of such technologies amends the marginal 
abatement curve available to firms. We assume that the specific technology that 
we model has high initial costs prior to investment in comparison to the price of 
carbon produced by the carbon policy. Thus in order for such technologies to be 
deployed initially, at the time of the initial investment there must be some 
expectations of future profitability (infra-marginal rents) for the firm to make 
the initial investment. After the initial investment, the sunk cost no longer affects 
operational or pricing choices. Our aim is to generate the amount of returns a 
firm can earn over and above this sunk cost for the different instruments for 
given assumptions over technology and emission uncertainty. 
 
In the interest of simplicity we assume that the firm faces the choice between 
two investments both yielding the same output which can be sold in the same 
market3, one of which is the new technology and one of which is termed a 
reference option, R4.  Essentially we assume the firm has a choice of investing in 
                                                 
3 We assume that the firm is unable to pass on the carbon costs to the consumers of its product. 
4 This can be thought of as a standard high-carbon technology. 
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two plants which produce the same amount of product. This allows us to 
disregard the effect of the technology on other costs and the wider product 
market and focus solely on abatement and the impact of the carbon policy. The 
two investments are assumed to have different emissions levels and capital and 
operating costs. The new technology is assumed to have reduced emission levels 
and higher capital and operating costs in comparison to the reference option, 
and thus has a positive cost of abatement. 
 
Our model utilises a defined marginal abatement curve for both the firm, FtA , and 
the system, StA . This allows us to determine the price of carbon that is necessary 
to produce a level of abatement as defined by an assumed cap. We assume the 
firm has a wide range of abatement opportunities open to it which may result 
from a diversified plant portfolio and allows us to assume a continuous 
abatement curve for the firm, rather than a discrete series of options. Further we 
assume that there is a defined, monotonic (by definition) and therefore 
invertible5 abatement function for both the firm and the system that determines 
the amount of abatement undertaken as a function of the price of carbon faced, 
whether through a carbon tax, T, or from purchasing allowances in a market, 
with price P. Furthermore we assume that these functions are stable over all 
periods in our model.6 We assume this stability in order to simplify our analysis 
and define a single abatement curve for our model that remains for all periods. 
The assumption of stability effectively removes one element of uncertainty from 
our model, allowing us to focus on uncertainty regarding emission forecasts and 
the individual technology.   
 
The new technology requires an additional level of investment It over the 
reference option, with an investment in period t resulting in a level of expected 
abatement, NTtQ 1+ , in the subsequent period t+1, implying a function )( 1NTtt QII += . 
This initial investment in the technology effectively creates additional abatement 
opportunities which are depicted by a new linear section in the abatement curve 
at an abatement cost of NT, k , up to a volume of NTQ  and shifts the abatement 
curve past this point (see Figure 3). The abatement cost includes both the 
operating cost of the technology and additional inputs that may be required in 
order to produce the same output of the good defined in terms of cost per ton of 
CO2 abated.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This is assumed in order for prices of permits and amounts of abatement to be determined in 
the model. 
6 This is a strong assumption.  Work by Morris, Paltsey and Reilly (2008) and Klepper and 
Peterson (2006) have discussed the stability of the abatement curve with shifting global energy 
prices and policies in other regions.  We assume stability as it allows us to have one abatement 
curve throughout the model and we can ignore any endogenity between factors in our model and 
the abatement curve. 
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Figure 3: Effect of investment in new technology on the abatement cost curve 
 
The government sets either the carbon tax tT  or the level of allowances that it 
auctions7, CaptE . There is a single market price that arises from these auctions, Pt , 
at which firms can purchase all the allowances it requires. Firms are required to 
purchase allowances for all of their emissions in any single period and there is no 
banking or borrowing of allowances and no external purchases of credits from 
other mechanisms. We define the variable tCap  as the actual level of abatement 
required in the system as a whole. tCap  is thus the difference between the level 
of emissions firms would produce without any climate policy, ( { }SFjE jt ,∈ ), and 
the volume of allowances offered for auction: 
 
 
 
We determine prices in the carbon market using the intersection of the level of 
overall abatement required, Capt, and the overall abatement function of both the 
firm and the rest of the system, WtA .  
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where )(1 tWt CapA
− is the inverse of WtA defined at the level of abatement Capt. This 
allows the price to be determined for all cases, including when the technology is 
the price setter. 
 
We model three periods in order to model a programme of investment, where 
firms commit to undertaking an initial investment followed by a second larger 
investment in the subsequent period.   
 
In the reference option the firm undertakes investment in the reference plant in 
Period 1, and then is able to utilise the plant in Periods 2 and 3. 
 
In the scenario where the firm undertakes investment in the new technology the 
following occurs: 
 
• In Period 1, the firm undertakes investment in the new technology. This 
investment could be in a number of different forms. For example, it could 
be that the firm undertakes construction of a new coal plant fitted with 
CCS. The plant does not become operational until Period 2 and thus does 
not affect emissions or output revenues in Period 1.   
 
• In Period 2, the firm can operate the new technology that they have 
invested in with a corresponding impact on both the firm and overall 
abatement function. As per the programme of investment there is a 
further investment in Period 2 which results in further deployment of the 
technology in Period 3. This allows us to model a situation where a firm 
builds one pilot plant initially, and then undertake a larger deployment, to 
further their experience and knowledge of the technology. Although these 
investments could be thought of as one single investment through staged 
payments we choose to model it as two separate investments to more 
closely represent the real-world decision-making and also to leave scope 
for future extension to the model where the second investment is 
contingent on various results from the first. At this stage we assume that 
the second investment occurs unconditional on the outcome of the initial 
investment. 
 
 
We assume that the level of investment in this Period is twice the scale of 
that which occurred in Period 1 and the resulting level of abatement in 
Period 3 is double that achieved in Period 2. We further assume a learning 
curve in investment costs related to the actual level of abatement in 
Period 2: 
)()( 23
FF QIQI α= , where 0<α<1 
 
• In Period 3 the firm is able to operate both the technology from the 
realisation from investment in Period 1 and also the realisation of the 
technology from the subsequent investment in Period 2. The third period 
can be conceptually thought of as an extension of the second. 
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Our current model does not count benefits beyond Period 3 in order to simplify 
the analysis. There are, however, a number of possible reasons as to why the firm 
may not value benefits beyond this horizon in making their original 
commitment: firms may be expecting a mandate to implement the technology; 
they may discount heavily due to scepticism about sustained political 
commitment to the climate policy beyond this point; or they may be unable to 
harness their comparative advantage over the technology  due to, for example, 
all firms having free access to the technology at this point. This does mean, 
however, that our model tends to underestimate the potential strategic returns 
to the investment that may result from being an early developer and investor in 
the technology. 
 
As discussed above we examine costs solely in terms of abatement costs and 
compliance with the carbon policy as in our model the firms’ choice of 
investment does not change their overall output or the market that they can sell 
it in.  
 
In Period 1, costs to the firm under both scenarios are a function of the level of 
abatement undertaken, the level of emissions from the firm before abatement 
and the investment costs in the new technology.8 In the reference scenario the 
last term of this equation is zero as there is no additional investment. 
)()().( 2
0
1111
1
NT
P
FFF QIdPPAPEC +−= ∫  
In Period 2 in the new technology scenario, costs are a function of level of 
abatement, the level of emissions from the firm before abatement, the realised 
abatement from the new technology and the operating costs of the technology. 
Costs in period 3 are similar but without the additional investment. 
 
∫
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We define the returns from investment as the present value of reduced costs for 
the firm in comparison to the reference scenario. In order to calculate this we 
compare the costs that the firm would face, with and without the investment in 
the new technology.   
 
 
The total return under a cap-and-trade scheme in one time period is: 
)()().().( NTt
P
P
F
t
F
tt
R
t
NT
ttt QIdPPAEPPQkPReturn
R
t
t
−−−+−= ∫  
                                                 
8 We use the case of the cap-and-trade scheme as we set out our model.  Unless otherwise stated 
the formulas are the same for the tax scheme, with P replaced by T. 
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where }3,2{∈t and RtP  is the level of the carbon price in the reference option with no 
investment in the technology. 
 
Overall returns are the discounted sums of these Returns over all time periods.9   
 
We build three main sources of uncertainty into our model: uncertainty over the 
emissions levels without abatement for both the firm and the rest of the system; 
uncertainty over the operating cost of the new technology; and uncertainty over 
the level of abatement from the initial investment.   
 
In order to model the uncertainty over emissions levels, we assume that there is 
an emission ‘shock’ which affects both the firm and the system in Periods 2 and 
3. This shock can be thought of as a change in general economic conditions which 
affects the output of firms, and therefore emissions. One complexity facing both 
firm and regulators is that such emission ‘shocks’ could occur at any time, and 
may or may not persist. To capture this we assume that there can be persistence 
in the shock across periods. In order to model this we use two correlated normal 
distributions. 
 
),0(~ 222 σNX This is the shock that occurs in Period 2 
),0(~ 233 σNX    This is the shock that occurs in Period 3 
δ=),( 32 XXCov  The covariance of the shocks that occur in Periods 2 and  
                              3 
 
Emissions of the firm in Period 2 are equal to the expected level plus a random 
draw from 2X  while emissions in Period 3 are equal to the expected level plus a 
random draw from 3X . The same draws, scaled up, are used to calculate 
emissions for the system.10 The uncertainty in emissions levels before abatement 
implies that, although the government can define the level of emissions allowed 
with certainty, the level of abatement that this implies is uncertain. 
 
We model technology uncertainty by making a random draw from a normal 
distribution )),((~ 2kkENk σ  where )(kE is the expected operating cost of the 
new technology.  
 
In order to model uncertainty over the outcome from the initial level of 
investment, we assume that the amount of abatement that the firm can utilise in 
Period 2 resulting from the firm’s initial investment in Period 1 is uncertain. The 
actual level of abatement available is drawn from a uniform 
distribution ),(~2 βαUQ NT , where α is the lower bound and β  the upper bound 
of abatement realised. 
                                                 
9 These formulae work in the simple restricted case.  In order to calculate returns for all cases we 
extend these formulae to examine cases where the new technology is marginal, or where all 
emissions are abated. See Annex 2  for full equations that operate in all cases. 
10 This implies perfect correlation between the shocks faced by the firm and the system.  This 
may implicitly downplay the scale of uncertainty in the system as firms may face heterogeneous 
shocks to emission levels from those faced by the system. 
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Figure 4 gives a timeline of the model we construct, illustrating the three periods 
and the actions of the firm in each period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Timeline of the model 
 
One of the key questions in comparing instruments is the basis for comparison: 
what is the suitable tax level for evaluation with cap-and-trade schemes. The 
choice of the tax level, like the decision on where to set the cap, is essentially a 
political decision and subject to a wider range of factors. 
 
In our model we assume that the government has determined the desired level of 
emissions and sets CaptE (the level of the cap under certainty) accordingly. When 
setting a tax it aims to set it at the level which, to the best of its knowledge, will 
meet this target.  
 
We explore three different cases over how the government defines the tax given 
this objective: 
• Case 1: The tax is set at the level necessary to meet the certain level of 
abatement in the reference scenario, with no new technology, and 
remains unchanged whether the firm invests or not. This implies larger 
returns to the cap-and-trade scheme under certainty as the firm benefits 
both from the drop in permit prices due to the introduction of the new 
technology and from the need to purchase fewer allowances. 
• Case 2: The tax is set at the level necessary to meet the desired level of 
abatement assuming the maximum abatement from the new technology, 
if investment is undertaken. This essentially assumes that the government 
is optimistic with regard to the implementation of the new technology 
and only observes the best-case scenario.  
• Case 3: The tax is set at the mean level of the carbon price upon 
implementation of the new technology, and takes into account the 
uncertainties over the final level of emissions. Due to the convexity of the 
Period 1  Period 2  Period 3 
Firm makes 
second investment 
in technology 
Firm starts to 
operate new 
technology 
Firms operates 
expanded 
technology based on 
second investment 
Firm undertakes 
investment 
programme and 
makes initial 
investment in 
technology 
Emission Shock X2 Emission Shock X3 
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abatement function this is higher than the level of tax that is required 
given a certain level of abatement. 
 
The choice of tax between the three cases is, in essence, determined by the speed 
of adjustment of the government to new technologies and the level of 
information available. The first case represents where there is no, or extremely 
delayed adjustment once new technologies appear; the second when there is no 
uncertainty taken into account; and the third, where the government observes 
the technology and the uncertainty but can only set the level of tax once every 
period.   
 
One instrument that has been proposed to improve the performance of cap-and-
trade schemes is the use of price floors and ceilings. Floors may be 
operationalised by setting a reserve price on auctions (Hepburn et al 2006, 
Grubb and Neuhoff 2006). Option contracts are an alternative mechanism 
through which floors could be introduced. Ceilings can be introduced by a 
commitment to release extra allowances into the system when the ceiling is 
reached. We introduce price floors and ceilings to the cap-and-trade scheme in 
order to examine the impact of these instruments. 
 
 4. Data Description 
 
We parameterise the model with two example technologies, Biomass for 
electricity and CCS, the specific details of which are discussed below. 
 
We choose the firm size to approximately mimic the size of a large diversified 
energy supplier, namely EON, and we set the system to approximately match the 
remainder of the operators under the EUETS. 
 
We define the input data annually and assume that each period, t, is of five years 
duration,  with both cost data and returns delineated in 2005 US$. We aggregate 
and discount annual surpluses into total surpluses for each period and use the 
weighted-average capital cost to EON before taxes as the discount rate (9.1%).  
 
We draw abatement functions for both the firm and the system from the IIASA 
GGI scenario database (IIASA 2007). The scenario provides discrete points for 
shadow prices of GHG and emissions for Europe as a whole, from which we draw 
a continuous function. We scale this down to fit the size of the EUETS relative to 
European emissions in total.11 We assume that the firm represents 
approximately 5% of the total trading scheme (approximately the size of EON) 
                                                 
11 By doing so, we are implicitly assuming that the EUETS has the same mitigation options available to 
it as Europe as a whole, and that the firm has the same options as the system.  This is an abstraction 
given that it is likely there are a number of lower-cost mitigation options available to Europe (energy 
efficiency being perhaps the clearest example).We use data for both WEU and EEU which also include 
non-member states, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Switzerland 
and Turkey.  We scale the function by half to reflect the size for the ETS compared to the total area, 
and also the reflection that more of the abatement is likely to occur in the ETS compared to the area as 
a whole.  
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and we scale the abatement function accordingly. We set a declining cap over the 
three periods for emissions similar to that conceived for the EUETS phase III. 
 
In defining the scale of uncertainty in both emissions and technology, we draw upon 
previous literature. We use work from previous estimations of future ETS emissions 
to determine the approximate scale of uncertainty over emissions (CamEcon 2009).  
We choose an approximate range of +110 Mt CO212 a year for the system as a whole 
with firm uncertainty scaled accordingly. 
 
The specific shocks to the firm’s emissions we assume are: 
 
Shock in Period 2 )25.31,0(~2 NX  
Shock in Period 3 )25.31,0(~3 NX  
Covariance of shocks 5.0=δ  
 
We choose these distributions in order to give both the range of uncertainty that 
we discuss above and also identical variances in both periods.13   
 
We summarise the data for all variables and the form of all functions in Annex 1. 
As discussed above, in comparing cap-and-trade with tax, there are various 
options for defining tax levels. In table 1 we show the levels of carbon tax we 
derive for all three cases of tax formation and for the two different technologies. 
 
Tax Case
1
Tax Case 2
Without 
Investment
Tax Case 2
With 
Investment 
Biomass
Tax Case 2
With 
Investment 
CCS
Tax Case 3
Without 
Investment
Tax Case 3
With 
Investment 
Biomass
Tax Case 3
With 
Investment 
CCS
Period 1 19.01 19.01 19.01 19.01 19.01 19.01 19.01
Period 2 41.81 41.81 40.94 41.27 47.88 47.29 47.58
Period 3 73.48 73.48 70.06 71.33 79.43 76.6 77.95  
Table 1: Levels of Carbon Tax ($/tCO2) 
 
There has been relatively little work conducted on at what levels instruments 
such as price floors and ceilings should be set, thus we chose to set a floor and a 
ceiling to cut off a certain percentage of the distribution of carbon prices. We set 
a floor price to cut off the bottom 20% of the frequency distribution of carbon 
prices, given the uncertainties discussed above, and a price ceiling that cuts off 
the top 20% of the frequency distribution of prices. The subsequent results 
should thus be seen only as an indication of the potential impact of introducing a 
floor or ceiling and not as representing any particular optionality or expectation. 
 
 Price Floor Price Ceiling 
Period 2 19.48 72.82 
Period 3 41.11 111.44 
Table 2: Levels of Price Floor and Ceiling ($/tCO2) 
                                                 
12 Thus we set the standard deviation to approximately 110 Mt CO2 so that 95% of observations 
fall within this range 
13 These variances imply a standard deviation of 111.80 for the system as a whole, reflecting the 
range of estimates of emissions projections. 
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 4.1 Biomass  
 
We first run our model for electricity-generating biomass plants. These have a 
similar cost structure as assumed in our model in terms of significant capital and 
subsequent operating costs. Biomass for power is a relatively mature technology 
with relatively low uncertainty over the technology involved. There are still large 
questions, however, over the supply chain for the fuel inputs and the load factor 
at which such plants could operate.14 
 
We assume that the firm operates the technology as baseload, operating it 
without reference to the carbon price. If the price of carbon, P, falls below the 
operating costs of the technology, k, the firm operates biomass over the most 
expensive abatement options it would have undertaken without the technology.  
 
We use a reference scenario investment of a 500MW supercritical coal-plant 
drawing on data on capital costs, operating costs and emissions from the 
Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM 2006).15 
 
We draw data for biomass for capital and operating cost from a study by Caputo 
et al (2005), and a study by the European Commission (2008). We estimate 
additional capital investment at $190 million for construction of 10 50MW 
biomass fired power plants16 in comparison to the reference scenario.  
 
Estimates for the range of operating costs are drawn from both studies and the 
range observed there have led to us choosing a distribution for the abatement 
cost as: 
 
Abatement cost of Biomass for power $ per ton carbon  
)9,34(~ Nk  
 
As emissions from biomass do not have to be accounted for under the EU ETS, 
abatement is equal to the emissions produced by the alternative investment, the 
supercritical coal plant. We assume that there is uncertainty over the load factor 
for the biomass plant, which realises itself as uncertainty over the level of 
abatement vis-à-vis the alternative investment17. We model this uncertainty with 
a uniform distribution: 
                                                 
14 We make the assumption that the firm does not face constraints over the supply chain for the 
biomass power plant and thus can operate the plant as baseload generation. 
15 Due to the estimate base load for the biomass plants the actual size of the plant is 596.5MW. 
We use the standard assumptions in the IECM model for a SCR+ESP+FGD plant, with the 
exception of the coal price which we amend to $70/t in order to reflect the higher prices in the 
EU. 
16 This is based upon data from Caputo et al (2005) for capital investment in 10 50MW plants utilising 
fluid bed composition followed by steam turbine cycle generation, using a biomass composed of 
agricultural crops by-products, agro-industrial and wood wastes. 
17 We implicitly imply here that the firm can produce the same amount of product despite 
varying load factor, this may imply the use of small amounts of fossil fuel input and thus reduce 
the abatement that is possible vis-à-vis the reference plant.     
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where the upper bound of abatement is based upon emissions from the 
reference plant drawn from IECM (2006). 
 
The investment function, )( NTtQI , is parameterised as a linear function using the 
upper bound level of abatement with the figure for additional capital investment. 
 
We assume a learning curve that affects this investment function that depends 
on the actual realisation from the initial investment. Capital costs fall by 
approximately 5% from a full realisation of abatement, declining as the 
realisation falls (for full parameterisation see Annex 1). 
 
4.2 CCS 
CCS is an additional technology, whose cost and risk structure is broadly 
appropriate to our model structure. It is a technology that is likely to require 
large initial investments in terms of capital/learning costs, but will also require 
significant operating costs beyond this investment. The initial investment may 
open opportunities for wider deployment of the technology, and may be 
externally funded, at least partially, through government support. CCS is an 
immature technology, in comparison with biomass for power, with greater 
uncertainty over costs and performance.  
 
Along with this greater scale of uncertainty CCS has further differences from 
biomass.  In that it is not central to generation of the product it is possible for the 
abatement technology to be switched off whilst the product can still be 
produced. This may be the case if the carbon price falls below the level of 
operating cost of the technology. With this in mind we make an amendment to 
the model used for biomass to allow the firm to choose to abate or not depending 
on the carbon price and the operating cost of the technology.18  
 
In its operation CCS consumes a percentage of a plant’s output, implying that 
factors such as the electricity-carbon price spread will play a role in its 
investment incentives and decision to operate.19 By allowing a bound of 
uncertainty over the operating cost of the technology, which includes costs of 
forgoing electricity we implicitly include this factor, but do not model electricity 
prices explicitly.   
                                                 
18 The amendment to the equations are outlined in Annex 2. 
19 CCS is a relatively unique technology in that it is consumes some of the output of the plant 
when it is in operation, consuming roughly a third of the plant’s supply. This can be recovered, 
however, by switching off the technology.  Thus, the choice between operating the plant with and 
without CCS depends on what the firm can gain from selling the extra output, versus the extra 
cost it incurs from the carbon price. For instance, when carbon prices are low and it is 
uneconomic to run the technology, the firm can gain from producing and selling the extra 
electricity.   
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We draw data, for capital investment, operating costs and abatement from IECM 
(2006) and maintain the reference scenario as an investment in a 500MW 
supercritical coal plant20. Additional capital investment for construction of a 
plant with CCS is $450 million, which covers both the cost of the CCS and the cost 
of constructing a larger plant which is required to match the output of the 
reference plant due to CCS consuming a percentage of the plant’s output.   
 
For the range of uncertainty regarding the technology, we surveyed a range of 
literature (IECM 2006, IEA 2008, IPCC 2005, Rubin et al 2007, McKinsey 2009) 
and chose an approximate scale of uncertainty based upon the range of estimates 
given.    
 
 Operating cost of CCS, in $ per ton carbon abatement 
)25,35(~ Nk  
 
Abatement for CCS, MtCO2 is also drawn from these studies and determined in 
comparison to the plant without CCS.  The distribution chosen is: 
)2,1(~2 UQ
NT  
with the upper bound drawn from abatement level from IECM (2006). 
 
We parameterise the investment equation in the same manner as for biomass 
and assume the same learning curve over capital investment. 
 
 5. Results  
 
We run Monte-Carlo simulations of 50,000 observations each, for both 
technologies, for the three cases of tax formation and for cap and trade schemes 
with and without the use of price floors and ceilings. We obtain net present value 
surpluses under the various instruments, which we aggregate into histograms to 
obtain a distribution of net present value surplus returns.  Full results can be 
found in Annex 321. 
 
We find that in two out of three cases, cap-and-trade schemes generate a higher 
mean, but also a greater distribution in, returns over investment than under tax 
regimes. This higher mean is evident when the tax is set as per Case 1 and 3, with 
the tax showing a slightly higher mean when the tax is set as per Case 2.   
 
In a cap-and-trade scheme the price adapts to states of the world where 
emissions are higher or lower than expected. The convexity of the marginal 
                                                 
20 We compare between a super-critical coal plant of 500MW without CCS and a 661.4MW plant 
with CCS to ensure that the annual power generation is equivalent, following the same 
assumptions as the reference plant in the biomass case.   
21 Note that the results for each technology are drawn from six separate simulations. The 
reported results for the cap and trade scheme and cap with floor are drawn from the same 
simulation as for Tax Case 1. The comparison of returns over investment between instruments 
utilise the results for the cap and trade scheme in the different simulations. There are small 
differences between these simulations, thus the results for the comparison between instruments 
may not tally with the returns over investment. 
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abatement curve implies that in our model higher than expected emissions drive 
carbon prices higher than they would fall due to lower than expected emissions. 
As these carbon prices are a key determinant of the returns to the technology the 
higher returns under higher than expected emissions outweigh the lower returns 
when there are lower than expected emissions. The tax is unable to adjust to 
these changes in expected emissions.  
5.1 Results for Biomass 
When we apply the model to biomass for power we observe positive mean 
returns under all instruments.   
 
Under a tax, set as per case 1, mean returns over investment are $191 million 
with a standard deviation (σ) of 88 million with zero or greater returns observed 
in 99% of cases. Under a cap and trade scheme mean returns over investment 
are $657 million (σ=873  million) with zero or greater returns observed in 
78% of cases. The cap in comparison to the tax generates a greater average 
return of $467 million, with the cap generating greater or equal returns in 71% 
of cases.  
 
When we amend the tax to case 2, we assume the government has knowledge 
regarding the technology and sets taxes based upon the upper bound of 
abatement arising from it. In this case the average mean return over investment 
under the tax increases to $669 million (σ=92 million). The advantage of cap-
and-trade schemes over taxes decreases in this case as both the tax level and the 
price of carbon adjust to the introduction of the technology. We observe that the 
tax provides an average surplus of $10 million over cap-and-trade (σ=853 
million), with the cap generating greater or equal surpluses 47% of the time. 
 
With our final amendment to the process of tax formation, where the 
government has knowledge of the technology and also the scope of the 
uncertainty, we observe that the returns under the tax over investment reduce to 
an average of $652 million (σ=99 million). The advantage of cap-and-trade 
schemes over tax returns with a mean return over the tax of $3 million (σ=830 
million), with the cap generating greater or equal surpluses 48% of the time.  
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the returns we obtained over investment for 
the tax under case 3 and a cap-and-trade scheme.  
 
We examine the use of price floors and ceilings as amendments to standard cap-
and-trade schemes. When we compare the instruments, we find that the scheme 
with the floor generates a greater return vis-à-vis the tax compared with the 
standard scheme.  
 
The introduction of price floors raises the mean return of investment by $52 
million (σ=148 million) with respect to the standard cap-and-trade scheme, with 
returns greater or equal in 93% of cases. The floor causes these effects by 
reducing the lower end of returns when emission shocks are negative and 
carbon prices collapse, as prices only fall to the level of the floor. 
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Price ceilings reduce the advantage of cap-and-trade schemes over taxes with 
returns lower than taxation in two cases. With price ceilings and floors we 
observe that the mean return to investment falls, with the instrument with floors 
and ceilings producing mean returns that are-$187 million (σ 515 million) lower 
than a standard scheme. This is due to the fact that the ceiling reduces the 
number of cases when high surpluses are obtained, as high carbon price 
scenarios are removed. Despite these effects the instrument with ceilings and 
floors generates a greater return than taxes in the majority of cases where, due 
to the floor reducing low returns from low carbon price scenarios. Figure 6 
illustrates the returns over investment under the tax in case 3, in comparison 
with the standard cap-and-trade scheme and a scheme with a floor and ceiling. 
There are two clear spikes in the distribution around the level of returns 
associated with cases of the world where either the floor or ceiling is enacted in 
both periods, i.e. the spike at the left hand side of the distribution is associated 
with floors being active in both periods, and the spike on the right hand side is 
related to ceilings being enacted in both periods.   
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Figure 5: Distribution of returns over investment under tax case 3 and a cap and trade scheme 
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Figure 6: Distribution of returns over investment for a tax, cap-and-trade and cap and trade with 
floor 
 
5.2 Results for CCS 
When we apply our model to CCS we find that, under the assumptions we have 
made, mean returns from the technology are negative under all cases of tax 
formation. The mean returns vary between -$616 million (under case 1) to -$302 
million (under case 2).  In all cases we find less than 0.01% observations of zero 
or greater returns.     
 
We find that a standard cap-and-trade scheme generates a mean return of -$307 
million over investment, with a standard deviation (σ) of $467 million. Positive 
observations are observed 22% of the time.  When comparing the returns under 
a cap-and-trade scheme in comparison to tax under case 3 we find that the cap 
generates a greater or equal return in 48% of cases, with a greater mean surplus 
of $40 million. 
 
These results underline that the levels of cap and carbon tax levels potentially 
debated, are in general insufficient to make CCS investment economic over the 
next 15 years without government support. This is in stark contrast to the 
results for biomass where, for the assumptions we make, both caps and taxes 
generate positive mean returns in all cases. Despite the negative returns the 
choice of instrument does have a strong bearing on the size of deficit and hence 
the scale of additional support that may be required. 
 
In Figure 7 we compare the distribution of returns under a cap-and-trade 
scheme and a tax determined as per case 3. We observe a spike in observations 
for the cap-and-trade scheme, caused by the large amount of cases where the 
carbon prices is not high enough, in either period, to operate the technology and 
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thus the surplus is equal to the investments in the technology. In the tax case we 
do not observe this as the tax level is sufficiently high so that in at least one 
period it is higher than the operating cost and thus the technology is operated.   
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Figure 7: Distribution of returns under tax case 3 and a cap-and-trade scheme compared to 
investment  
 
When we introduce price floors and ceilings to the cap-and-trade scheme, we 
observe similar results to those found under biomass. 
 
We find that the scheme with the floor generates a greater return compared with 
the standard scheme (returns are on average $1 million higher (σ =28 million)) 
and generates a greater or equal return in 94% of cases.  
 
When we introduce the ceiling along with the floor, the average return from the 
instrument over a standard cap-and-trade scheme falls to -$137 million (σ 269 
million) although 62% of the time the instrument still generates greater or equal 
returns than a standard cap.  Figure 8 compares the distribution of returns under 
a tax, cap-and-trade and cap-and-trade with price floors and ceilings.  
 
 24 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
-9
50
-7
10
-4
70
-2
30 10 25
0
49
0
73
0
97
0
12
10
14
50
16
90
19
30
21
70
24
10
Return (M$)
N
um
be
r 
of
 o
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
Tax
Cap
Cap with floor and
ceil ing 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of returns over investment for a tax, cap-and-trade and cap and trade with 
floor and ceiling 
 
 
 6. Policy Implications 
 
Our comparison of the differing firm-level incentives to investment in new 
technologies produced by different instruments offers a range of insights for 
policy.   
 
The ability of carbon prices to react to uncertain states of the world produces, in 
two cases of tax formation, higher average returns for cap-and-trade schemes 
than for tax regimes, These returns are driven by states of the world with high 
carbon prices, driven by higher than expected emissions. The average returns 
from the cap-and-trade scheme are associated with a higher distribution of 
returns than under taxes, thus the risk-preference of the firm must be taken into 
account when deducing which instrument creates the greater overall incentive 
for investment. 
 
In standard economic theory, firms require higher returns when there is higher 
risk. Whether the higher returns on average under a cap-and-trade are enough to 
counter-balance the higher risk is uncertain and therefore, so is whether cap-
and-trade schemes truly give greater incentives. Given that floors both increase 
the average and reduce the distribution of returns, they are likely to improve the 
incentives for investment from cap-and-trade schemes whatever this risk 
preference, although they may increase the cost of compliance for the firm as a 
whole. The effect of ceilings is more ambiguous. Although they reduce the overall 
distribution of returns, they also reduce the average return, and it is not certain 
which of these effects dominates with regard to the overall incentive to 
investment. 
 
It is important to stress that investment must also be placed in context of the 
wider risks facing the firm. We find that returns to low carbon investment are 
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highest under a cap-and-trade scheme when emissions are at their greatest due 
to positive shocks. It is likely that this will occur when the economy is strong and 
demand for electricity is high. This implies that returns to such investment are 
highest when revenues for the firm are likely to be at their highest, thus 
amplifying the risk faced by the firm. In contrast it is in these times that the costs 
of compliance with the carbon policy are also likely to be highest, so investments 
in such technologies can help hedge some of the risk associated with such 
compliance.  
 
There is a question as to how probable states of the world with higher than 
expected carbon prices are. In two cases so far (EU ETS phase I and phase II) 
there have been dramatic price falls caused, at least in part, by over-allocation of 
emission permits. There are certain mitigating circumstances for this. Phase I 
was essentially a trial and thus the over-allocation can be seen as part of the 
learning experience; while phase II has taken place within the backdrop of the 
largest economic recession in living memory. Despite this there are questions as 
to whether the distribution of emissions should be modelled as per a normal 
distribution or whether there are longer tails on the downside than the upside. 
This may be the case if there are systematic reasons why emissions or the 
projected costs of meeting caps are overestimated, causing caps to be set too 
high (for a discussion of such reasons see Grubb and Ferrario 2006). 
 
The choice of the tax level, like the setting of the cap, is a political decision and 
thus subject to a wide variety of factors. We examine different methods for tax 
formation and find that the performance vis-à-vis the cap-and-trade varies 
accordingly. We vary the tax based upon three different cases, where 
governments have varying ability to predict future technologies and calculate 
uncertainty. We find that taxes perform best when governments make the most 
optimistic assumptions regarding the technology. Given the inertia often in place 
in government regulation and tax-setting, it is questionable how well 
governments can set taxes that take into account these factors, and thus how 
well the tax can perform in practice.  
 
Cap-and-trade schemes are associated with a greater distribution of returns, and 
thus a greater degree of risk. Price floors and ceilings are two instruments that 
can be used to mitigate some of the risk associated with cap-and-trade schemes 
as they remove states of the world with very low or very high carbon prices. The 
use of floors in our model reduces the distribution of returns and increases the 
average return over a standard cap-and-trade scheme in the range of $1-59 
million NPV for the levels chosen, thus improving incentives for investment no 
matter the risk preference of the firm. The use of ceilings reduces the 
distribution of returns and also decreases the average return by approximately 
$140-190 million NPV over cap-and-trade schemes for the levels chosen, thus its 
effect on investment incentives is ambiguous and depends on the firms’ appetite 
for risk.   
 
The introduction of price floors and ceilings to cap-and-trade schemes raises the 
prospect of competing incentives. Firms may prefer price ceilings as they can cap 
the cost of compliance with the carbon policy, yet they reduce returns to 
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investment in new low-carbon technologies. The scale of these competing 
incentives will depend on the structure of the generation capacity of the firm, 
with firms who rely more heavily on high-carbon generation having greater 
incentives for price ceilings, in comparison to firms with a greater low-carbon 
generation base. 
 
There are important questions to be answered over the level at which floors and 
ceilings should be set to maximise incentives to firms, but also to enable 
sufficient emission reductions and to minimise overall costs of compliance. 
Examining a curve of returns weighted by frequency allows some insights into 
the levels of floors and caps that might be effective. Figure 9 displays this curve 
for carbon prices averaged over Period 2 and Period 3 for both technologies. The 
curve highlights that for CCS average carbon prices over $85/t average returns 
are positive22, whilst for biomass this level is $39/t. This highlights that a price 
floor placed at $85/t would remove the vast majority (although not all) of 
negative returns for CCS, whilst for biomass one at $39/t would be sufficient. A 
ceiling at $150/t would still preserve the vast majority of returns (81% of the 
positive probability-weighted returns for CCS, and 95% for biomass). 
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Figure 9: Returns weighted by frequency against average carbon prices in Period 2 and Period 3 
 
Although the aim of our model is to examine the effect of instrument choice, 
rather than to fully model the investment decisions surrounding either 
technology there are some broad conclusions regarding the technologies that we 
can draw. 
 
                                                 
22 Although individual returns for carbon prices can be negative.  We found that for our 
assumptions the lowest average carbon price for which there are no negative returns observed 
was $136/t 
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For one of the technologies we model, CCS, we find that given our assumptions 
over the technology and the evolution of the carbon policy, the programme of 
investment is uneconomic under both instruments over the 15-year period 
modelled. This may highlight why there is a relative lack of private investment in 
a technology that is anticipated to play a large role in energy generation in the 
coming decades. The negative returns could be thought of as the cost to the firm 
of ‘building the option’ of future deployment of the technology and whether such 
a cost should or could be borne by a firm or covered by external funding, such as 
government support, depends on the importance placed on the technology. If it is 
left to a firm, given the uncertainties over the returns and the scale of shortfall 
there are large risks that the risk-averse nature of firms may stymie investment, 
even with a carbon policy in place.  
 
The negative returns highlight the scale of external support that may be required 
in addition to a carbon instrument. For CCS the EU will allocate a small number 
of EUAs to plants operating the technology in the next phase of the EUETS. This 
is unlikely to mitigate the risks to the company as it is in low price scenarios that 
firms receive the lowest returns to investment, and it is also in these scenarios 
when such a subsidy would be worth the least.   
 
When we apply the model to biomass for power, for the assumptions we have 
made over scale, cost and abatement, all instruments produce positive returns. 
This highlights that for this technology there may be less justification for further 
external support on the scale of that that might be required for CCS. 
 
 7. Conclusions 
 
Meeting the challenge of climate change is likely to require large investments in 
new technologies. Our model shows that different instruments for carbon policy 
create different incentives for firms to invest in new abatement technologies.  
 
We build on existing work examining the choice of pollution abatement 
instrument on incentives to invest in new technology. By building in uncertainty 
and parameterising our model with assumptions relevant to the climate change 
problem and for suitable technologies, we also more closely model the incentives 
for investment in carbon-abating technologies. We build on literature such as 
Weitzman (1974), Pizer (2002) and Weber and Neuhoff (2009) that examines 
the choice of instrument between taxes and quantity constraints from an overall 
societal perspective for both pollution generally and climate change in particular, 
developing this work, focusing more specifically on the firm-level incentives that 
these instruments provide. By parameterising our model we move toward 
examining the firm-level preference for such instruments when investing in new, 
uncertain technologies.  
 
Under our assumptions and for the time period modelled cap-and-trade schemes 
yield greater returns on average than taxation in two out of three cases, yet with 
a larger distribution of returns. This is driven by the convexity of the abatement 
function and states-of-the-world with high carbon prices. Whether the higher 
return is enough to compensate for the higher risk depends on the risk 
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preference of the firm. The levels of both setting the cap and also the level of tax 
are political decisions. We investigate three different cases of tax formation, 
depending on the speed of adjustment of the government and the level of 
information taken into account. Taxes that are set with information regarding 
the investment and the technology perform best. 
 
The introduction of price floors and ceilings amend the performance of cap-and-
trade schemes with regard to both average returns and risk with respect to 
incentives to investment. In our model, for the assumptions we have made over 
technologies, floors improve both the mean and the distribution of returns, while 
ceiling reduce the distribution but also the mean. The overall incentives offered 
by the second depend on the risk-preference of the firm. There is a dichotomy 
here in that the introduction of floors can increase the overall cost of compliance 
for a firm as a whole but may increase the incentives for investment in any single 
low-carbon project.   
 
Our work fills a gap in the current literature in modelling the firm-level 
incentives emanating from different instruments for a programme of investment 
in a low-carbon technology in an uncertain world. It highlights the differences 
between the instruments in both the mean, and the distribution, of the returns to 
such an investment. As both tax and cap-and-trade schemes differ in both of 
these facets, the risk-preference of the firm is important in determining the 
actual incentives offered.  Future work investigating this area would be valuable 
in determining such incentives.  The overall impact of instruments such as price 
floors and ceilings, amend the incentives for investment into a single technology 
to the firm. This needs to be placed in the wider context of the firm, however, as 
they will also amend the overall cost of compliance. The incentives offered by 
these instruments depend on the levels at which they are initiated. Future 
research would be valuable in answering the questions that arise in this area. 
Since political economy considerations may anyway create strong pressures for 
a price cap, there are many reasons to investigate the properties of hybrid 
instruments – cap-and-trade with price collars – and additional research in this 
area will be crucial. 
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 Annex 1: Data used in model 
 
Variable Value Unit Source 
Firm’s 
emissions EF 
87 Mt 
CO2e 
Representative of EONs
ETS emissions 
System 
Emissions ES 
1920 Mt 
CO2e 
Representative of
remainder of trading
scheme 
Cap Period 1, 
Cap1 
1800 Mt 
CO2e 
  
Cap Period 2, 
Cap2 
1700 Mt 
CO2e 
  
Cap Period 3, 
Cap3 
1600 Mt 
CO2e 
  
Discount Rate 9.1 % EON’s reported Cost of
Capital 2008 
Overall 
abatement 
function 
C= 0.000436.A2 C is in 
$/ton 
A is in 
Mt 
Function from GGI
scenario database for WEU
for 2020 from B1 scenario.
Scaled to represent ETS 
Firm 1 
abatement 
function 
C= 0.17744.A2 C is in 
$/ton 
A is in 
Mt 
Scaled function of overall
abatement 
Amended 
abatement 
function 
C=0.0006132A2 C is in 
$/ton 
A is in 
Mt 
Scaled function of overall
abatement 
CCS 
Investment, I 
450 M$ US Additional capital
expenditure required to
build Supercritical coal
plant with CCS with same
output as 500MW plant
without (from IECM
model) 
Amount of CCS 
abatement, 
lower bound, α 
1 Mt 
CO2e 
 
Amount of CCS 
abatement, 
upper bound, β  
2 Mt 
CO2e 
The amount of CO2
avoided with CCS plant
(from IECM model).   
Abatement cost
of CCS, k 
35 $/t 
CO2e 
From difference in O&M
costs in plant with and
without CCS 
Learning curve 
))()(.(
)(
23
)015.01(
3
2 NTNTQ
NT
QEQE
QI
NT
−
=
−φ
 
 whereφ  is the amount of
investment required for
abatement of one MtCO2 in
a year. 
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Biomass 
Investment 
190 M$ US Additional capital
expenditure required to
build 10 50MW biomass
plants with over
supercritical coal plant
with same output 
Amount of 
Biomass 
abatement, 
lower bound, α 
2.2 MtCO2e  
Amount of 
Biomass 
abatement, 
upper bound β  
3.2 MtCO2e  
Abatement cost 
of biomass, k 
34 $/t 
CO2e 
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Cap and Trade Case 
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CCS amendment under tax 
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 Annex 3: Model Results 
 
Biomass 
 
Returns over 
investment 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum Percentage 
of 
observations 
>=0 
Tax case 1 190.68 87.60 592.33 -101.29 99.4% 
Tax case 2 668.53 92.02 1037.88 320.41 100% 
Tax case 3 652.05 98.72 1050.69 343.62 1005 
Cap and trade 657.28 872.81 6120.74 -1254.86 78.3% 
Cap with floor 714.79 798.44 6120.74 -888.48 80.0% 
Cap with ceiling 474.97 480.52 1753.44 -930.58 79.4% 
Comparison of 
returns between 
instrument 
     
Cap over tax 1 466.60 865.23 5802.06 -1375.45 70.6% 
Cap over tax 2 -9.92 826.70 6063.58 -1757.98 46.9% 
Cap over tax 3 3.41 830.09 5982.54 -1764.48 48% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 1 
524.11 790.37 5802.06 -1008.89 71.4% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 2 
47.77 751.92 6063.58 -1410.7 47.3% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 3 
60.30 756.50 5982.54 -1443.34 48.0% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 1 
283.93 469.77 1375.17 -1010.04 70.7% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 2 
-194.82 437.09 909.23 -1410.07 40.8% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 3 
-177.13 443.44 906.33 -1425.87 42.6% 
Cap with floor 
over cap 
57.51 152.07 682.44 -327.67 93.2% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over cap 
-187.42 515.54 677.79 -4639.51 61.2% 
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CCS 
 
Returns to 
investment 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum Percentage 
of 
observations 
≥ 0 
Tax case 1 -615.54 90.36 -246.90 -854.32 0% 
Tax case 2 -302.56 90.60 86.56 -603.26 0.01% 
Tax case 3 -349.70 100.01 45.77 -639.29 0.01% 
Cap and trade -306.99 466.57 3198.87 -942.04 22.3% 
Cap with floor -305.79 464.12 3198.87 -941.96 22.3% 
Cap with ceiling -446.64 278.39 526.54 -942.03 5.6% 
Comparison of 
returns between 
instrument 
     
Cap over tax 1 308.55 448.75 3618.77 -556.71 73.4% 
Cap over tax 2 -8.77 421.81 3018.76 -838.52 42.6% 
Cap over tax 3 40.72 428.18 3192.00 -813.07 47.9% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 1 
309.75 446.10 3618.77 -424.07 73.1% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 2 
-7.70 419.43 3018.76 -682.31 42.6% 
Cap with floor 
over tax 3 
41.96 425.56 3192.00 -665.81 47.9% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 1 
169.86 255.41 884.19 -404.36 72.5% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 2 
-142.57 237.28 553.87 -677.88 30.8% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over tax 3 
-95.56 241.70 595.34 -689.70 41.0% 
Cap with floor 
over cap 
1.20 28.01 183.38 -157.7 94.3% 
Cap with floor and 
ceiling over cap 
-137.33 269.32 186.49 -2758.39 61.7% 
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